Seaboard Finance Company v. L. V. Shire and Bank of Vernal : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Seaboard Finance Company v. L. V. Shire and Bank
of Vernal : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Romney and Boyer; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Seaboard Finance Co. v. Shire, No. 7299 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1068
: ·?299' 
IN ;·THE SUPREME COURT 
, ... ·, ;..' 
OF ,THE STATE 0~ UTAH 
' I As~.• .. . :·'.·,AAB. ·. _ nti. FINANCE coMPANY,' · r~·--ra on, 
-· · .Plaintiff, .Appellomt and 
Cross Respondent, 
-vs .. -
~ V .. flBmE, . ·doing, bmtiness as 
·<$ire'~;otor C~mpallY1 · 
· '· . : Defe'lllllO!ltt, 
~· O:Jr VERN~ .. 
. . :~Gai·W,shee~ Respondent and .~ 




. ·, i ,. ,. 
. ApPellant's ·Reply Brief 
ROMNEY AND BOYER, 
Attorneys for .Appellamt , 
428 Utah Oil Building ~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
Comment on Respondent's Statement of Facts ...................................... 1 
Argument ...................................................................................................•.... 2 
Specification of Error No. 1 ................................................................ 2 
Specifications of Errors Nos. 2 and 3 ........ .................. ... . .................. 4 
Specification of Error No. 4 ........................................... .... .. ....... .. .... 7 
Specification of Error No. 5 ....................................... __ . _ .... __ .. . . ........... 8 
Specification of Error No. 6 ................................................................ 12 
Specification of Error No. 7 ................................................................ 13 
Specification of Error No. 8 ................................................................ 13 
Reply to Appellant's Brief .......................................................................... 13 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Colonial Finance Co. vs. DeBenigno, 7 Atl. 2d 841, 125 Conn. 626 ...... 10 
Fuller vs. Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 Pac. 790 ........................................ 8 
General Finance Corporation vs. Krause Motor Sales, 
23 N. E. 2d 781, 302 Ill. App. 210 ...................................................... 10 
Guaranty Life Insurance Co. vs. Nelson, 101 Pac. 2d 627, 
187 Okla. 56 ............................................................................................ 4 
Harper vs. Tri-State Motors, Inc., 90 Utah 212, 58 Pac. 2d 18 .............. 6 
Hooper vs. Talbot, 175 N. E. 783, 343 Ill. 590 .......................................... 4 
Jankele vs. Texas Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 Pac. 2d 425 .................... 8 
In re Knight's Estate, 105 Utah 130, 141 Pac. 2nd 879 .......................... 6 
Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia, vs. Bowman, 
137 Pac. 2d 729, Cal. ............................................... , ............................ 10 
Speas vs. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 
125 S. E. 398, 188 N. C. 524 ................................................................ 4 
Vadner vs. Rozelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 Pac. 2d 561 .................................... 6 
Van Leeuwen vs. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 5 Pac. 2d 714 ........................ 6 
31 C. J. S. Pages 721-2 .................................................................................. 3 
Zollman on Banks and Banking, Vol. 7, Page 188 .................................. 3 
Session Laws of Utah, 1945, Pages 255-6, Uniform Trust 
Receipt Act .............................................................................................. 10 
Section 104-18-11 .......................................................................................... 12 
Section 104-18-12 ............................................................................................ 12 
Section 104-19-11 ............................................................................................ 3 
Section 104-19-13 .......................................................................................... 14 
Section 104-19-18 .................................................................................... 13, 14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UT'AH 
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, Appellant and 
Cross Respondent, 
-vs.-
L. V. SHIRE, doing business as 
Shire Motor Company, 
Defendant, 
BANK OF VERNAL, 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
COMMENT ON RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
Respondent has filed a Cross Appeal and has made 
a lengthy statement of facts in its Brief. Appellant 
contends that the facts essential to a determination of 
the controversy before this Court are set forth in Ap-
pellant's original Brief and that much of the detail set 
out by Respondent is irrelevant, immaterial and super-
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fluous. Appellant specifically controverts certain por-
tions of Respondent's Statement of Facts as follows: 
(a) Appellant controverts the statement on Page 
6 of Respondent's Brief "on the same day accounted 
for the minimum sale price of one of the Frazer cars", 
and the statement in the same paragraph as follows: 
"On January 6, 1948, he accounted for the minimum 
sale price of a second Frazer car", and the statement 
on Page 7 : ''Shire accounted for the third Frazer car 
listed in the Trust Receipt". Anything more than that 
payments were made on Shire's indebtedness to the 
Bank in the amounts set forth is a mere conclusion of 
Respondent. 
(b) Appellant controverts the last paragraph on 
Page 8 ending on the first two lines on Page 9. More 
will be said concerning this in discussing Respondent's 
Specification of Errors Nos. 2 and 3. 
ARGUMENT 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 1 
Respondent contends the Court. erred in not grant-
ing its Motion for a Non-suit upon the ground that 
Appellant failed to show that Shire had not authorized 
or consented to the Bank's making charges upon his 
account. Appellant proved that Shire had on deposit 
with the Bank $2783.17 on February 13, 1948, and 
$2605.00 on February 21, 1948, and that his account was 
charged by the Barnk with said amounts on said dates 
(Tr. 12 and 13). Appellant also proved that the entire 
amount of the $2783.17 was applied to the $11,270.00 
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note which was secured and that $805.00 of the $2605.00 
was credited by the Bank on the $1500.00 note which was 
secured. If the Bank had obtained authority or consent 
from Shire to the making of such charges, such was a 
matter of defense and not a part of Appellant's case. 
The pleadings in a Garnishment action are limited by 
Statute (Section 104-19-11). Although there is no plead-
ing as such the Bank in fact relies on the doctrine of' 
set-off, which is an affirmative defense. Appellant's 
situation is not unlike that of a suit by a depositor 
against a bank for the balance of his deposit. In such a 
case the depositor makes a prima facie case upon proof 
of a debt owing by the bank and is entitled to recover 
the whole amount, but for the proof by the bank of a 
valid set-off. (See Zollman on Banks and Banking, Vol. 
7, Page 188). 
The question of whether or not Shire authorized or 
consented to the charges made by the Bank was entirely 
within the knowledge of the Bank. For Appellant to 
prove there was no such authority or consent would be 
requiring it to prove a negative, the facts of which are 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the Bank. This the 
law does not require the Appellant to do. The general 
rule is stated in 31 C. J. S., Pages 721-2: 
"It is very generally held that, where the 
party who has not the general burden of proof 
possesses positive and complete knowledge con-
cerning the existence of facts which the party 
having that burden is called on to negative, or 
has peculiar knowledge or control of evidence as 
to such rna tters, the burden rests on him to pro-
duce the evidence, the negative averment being 
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taken as true unless disproved by the party 
having such knowledge or control.'' 
The text is supported by the cases therein cited, 
and particularly by the following: Hooper v. Talbot, 
175 N. E. 783, 343 Ill. 590. Speas v. Merchants' Bank & 
Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 125 S. E. 398, 188 N. C. 
524. Guaranty Life Insurance Company vs. Nelson, 101 
Pac. 2d 627, 187 Okl. 56. 
Appellant having shown that on the date of the 
Garnishment, Shire had funds on deposit, except for the 
Bank's claim thereto, it was encumbent upon the Bank 
to show it had a right to the use of those funds. Ther~­
fore the Court did not err in denying Respondent's 
motion for a non-suit. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR NOS. 2 and 3 
Respondent contends the Court erred in finding 
that the two charges in question made by the Bank were 
without any authority from Shire. The testimony of 
Mr. Meagher clearly shows that instead of Shire author-
izing the charging of his account as contended for by 
Respondent, he refused to give such authority. Mr. 
Meagher testified as follows (Tr. 51): 
''I asked him two or three times for a check 
on this one car, and he said, 'No, I don't know 
exactly how I stand, and I need a little money 
to go to Salt Lake on; but it will be all right 
Monday.' 
''Then I said: 'All right. I will expect pay-
ment for these cars Monday.' 
''He said : 'I will be back here Monday-if 
not Monday, at the latest, Tuesday.' 
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"I said: 'All right, you will clear up the 
whole line Y' 
~"He said: 'Yes.' " 
In the afternoon of the same day the conversation 
between ~Ir. Meagher and Shire of Friday, February 6, 
1948, came up again, and l\Ir. Meagher again testified 
to substantially the same thing. Upon being asked for 
a check to clear up the account Mr. Meagher testified 
that Shire said: 
''I have the money in the bank, but I would 
rather not give you a check because I have a few 
little checks outstanding; but I will pay you for 
that on J\fonday, when I discount all these con-
tracts in Salt Lake." (Tr. 54) 
It was only after a recess over night and upon the 
third time that l\Ir. Meagher was called to the stand 
that in response to a leading question from counsel he 
testified that Shire said it was 0. K. for the Bank to 
charge his account with the amount of the Frazer and 
the parts on Monday, February 9, 1948. (Tr. 109.) 
When this matter again came up in connection with 
the cross examination of Mr. J\feagher the statement of 
the Court and the understanding of Mr. Critchlow are 
helpful (Tr. 125): 
"The Court: Maybe this would be helpful: 
My understanding of his testimony was that he 
asked him if he could charge his account and he 
said he had some checks outstanding that he 
would go to Salt Lake and bring the money back 
Monday or Tuesday. 
'' l\Ir. Critchlow: That is my understanding 
of it. 
''The Court : I did not understand that he 
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authorized the defendant, or anybody else, in 
any way to withdraw from his checking account, 
but he wanted him not to withdraw, because he 
had some outstanding checks.'' 
Mr. Meagher's ''after-thought'' concerning the 
authority from Shire to make a charge on Monday fades 
into comparative insignificance in view of his prior tes-
timony referred to above and in face of the fact that no 
charge was made until Friday, the 13th. 
This being a law case this ,Court is bound by the find-
ings of the trial Court if there is any competent evidence 
to support them. Harper vs. Tri-State Motors, Inc. 90 
Utah 212, 58 Pac. 2d 18; Vadner, vs. Rozelle, 88 Utah 162, 
45 Pac. 2d 561; Van Leeuwen, vs. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 
5 Pac. 2d 714; In re Knight's estate, 105 Utah 130, 141 
Pac. 2d 879. The findings of the Court are not only sup-
ported by competent evidence, but by the weight of the 
evidence. 
Respondent claims that it had the right without 
Shire's authority, to charge his account for the Frazer 
car which was sold, because, so Respondent contends, the 
proceeds from the sale of the car were to have been held 
in trust for the Bank and at the time of the charge were 
not secured. This argument begs the whole question of 
the law suit. Appellant maintains that so long as any of 
the cars included in the trust receipt and chattel mort-
gage securing the $11,270.00 note were unsold that the 
note and trust receipt were secured. The Bank had one 
of the Frazer cars included in the trust receipt and chattel 
mortgage on hand and unsold at the time of Garnishment 
(Record Page 9). 
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Respondent claims that the deposit made on Febru-
ary 14, 1948, (the deposit slip is dated February 13, 1948, 
Exhibit "H") was intended by Shire to be applied on his 
indebtedness to the Bank. The evidence does not sup-
port this contention. The evidence on the contrary shows 
that a deposit slip was made out for the items involved, 
(Exhibit "H") which bears the initial "W", a Teller 
by the name of Winkel at the Bank (Tr. 75) and the 
figures $2564.00 in two places, are those of Mr. Winkel. 
Exhibit'' AA'' shows that the sum of $2564.00 was credit-
ed by the Bank to Shire's account on February 14, 1948. 
These being the facts there can be no inference that Shire 
intended this sum to be used to pay his debts to the Bank. 
It is more logical to assume he sent the funds for deposit 
to cover his outstanding checks. He was more greatly 
concerned about his outstanding checks than his indebt-
edness to the Bank, as is borne out by refenences made by 
both Appellant and Respon~ent to the testimony of Mr. 
Meagher concerning what Shire said about his checks. 
In any event here again not only competent evidence on 
this point, but the weight of the evidence supports the 
finding of the trial Court. 
Appellant conceeds that the bank had the right to 
apply $1800.00 of the $2605.00 charged against Shire's 
account to the payment of the $2065.00 unsecured note. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.4 
The Court did not err in failing to find that the 
minimum sale price of each of the Frazer cars in the 
Trust Receipt was $2504.84. Whether such was the agree-
ment is not a material issue raised by the pleadings, and 
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is not an ultimate fact essential to a determination of the 
controversy. This Court has held that findings should 
be limited to the ultimate facts to be ascertained. Fuller 
vs. Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 Pac. 790; J ankele vs, Texas 
Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 Pac. 2d 425. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 5 
Respondent contends the Court erred in not quash-
ing the Writ of Garnishment on the ground that the 
claims of Appellant sued upon were secured. The Appel-
lant's suit against Shire consists of three Causes of 
Action, each based upon an unpaid check. The First 
Cause of Action was for a check in the amount of $3230.69 
(Record 1) the Second Cause of Action was for a check 
in the amount of $509.08 (Record 2) and he Third Cause 
of Action was for a check in the amount of $100.00 
(Record 3). There can be no question but what the 
Appellant was entitled to a Garnishment on the Third 
Cause of Action for the reason that the check f«;>r $100.00 
was never secured. Appellant merely cashed the check 
for Shire as an accommodation (Tr. 91). The Appellant 
entered into a ''Floor plan'' arrangement with Shire 
wherein it financed the purchase of four automobiles: A 
1942 DeSoto and a 1941 Ford were the subject of one 
transaction evidenced by a Trust Receipt (Exhibit "3") 
and another trust receipt was executed for two 1948 
Frazer automobiles (Exhibit "4"). Shire paid for the 
Ford automobile by a check in the amount of $850.00 on 
February 2, 1948, at which time Appellant gave him a 
receipt, (Exhibit "I") and delivered to him the Title 
Certificate for the automobile. (Tr. 128). On February 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9, 1948, Shire delivered to Appellant his check for $509.08 
('vhieh check i~ the subject of Appellant's Second Cause 
of Action) and which was credited one-half to each car 
in Exhibit • '-!' ', and Shire was given a receipt for said 
amount (Exhibit ''J", Tr. 129-130). Universal C. I. T. 
paid one-half of the balanee on Exhibit "4" to pay for 
one of the Frazer automobiles (Tr. 130). On February 
12, 1948, Shire gaYe Appellant his check for $3230.69 
(whieh is the subjeet of Appellant's First Cause of 
Action) and which was given to pay for the other Frazer 
automobile in Exhibit "4" and for the DeSoto in Exhibit 
"3' '. At that time Appellant gave Shire a reeeipt for the 
amount of the check and delivered to him the Title Certi-
ficate for the DeSoto automobile (Tr. 130-131). At said 
time Shire reported to Appellant that he had sold the 
remaining Frazer automobile listed in Exhibit "4". The 
Frazer automobile was a new car; and had not been 
registered and no title certificate had been issued there-
for. Appellant held no title doeument whieh Shire needed 
to effect the registration of the automobile. The evi-
dence therefore is to the effeet that the two trust receipts 
were paid in the manner above set forth. 
Th Trust Receipt, Exhibit "4", eontains the fol-
lowing provision: 
"So long as Trustee is not in default here-
under, Trustee may in the regular course of his 
business sell said vehicles for cash, or on terms 
approved in advance by Entruster, for not less 
than the minimum sale price hereinabove set op-
posite said respective vehicles, plus a pro-rata 
part of all accrued interest and eharges here-
under. Trustee agrees in case of each sale to hold 
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in trust for Entruster the proceeds of such sale, 
together with any vehicle taken in trade, separate 
from his funds and property, and immediately 
to pay over and deliver said proceeds and trade 
vehicle to En truster.'' 
The amount owing on the trust receipt was not due 
until February 29, 1948, therefore Shire was not in de-
fault and had a right to sell the automobiles described 
therein. Upon a sale of said automobiles according to the 
terms of the trust receipt they were no longer secured 
by the trust receipt, but in lieu of the security the Trustee 
was obligated to hold the funds in trust for the Appellant. 
In other words, Shire was a trustee with the power to 
sell, and upon sale was obligated to account to Appellant, 
but Appellant did not have the right to follow the auto-
mobiles which were sold in the regular course of busines·s 
into the hands of a purchaser from Shire, but was limit-
ed to his right to require Shire to account for and pay to 
Appellant the minimum sale price of the automobiles 
listed. As authority for this contention the following 
cases are cited: Peoples Finance and Thrift Company of 
Visalia, vs. Bowman, 137 Pac. 2d 729 Cal., which holds 
as follows: 
"A buyer of an automobile from a dealer was 
a buyer in the ordinary course of trade and o b-
tained good title to the automobile free from the 
lien of the trust receipt." 
See also Colonial Finance Co. vs. DeBenigno, 7 Atl. 2d 
841, 125 Conn. 626 ; General Finance Corporation, vs. 
Krause 1\tiotor Sales, 23 N. E. 2d 781, 302 Ill. App. 210. 
The purchaser of the Frazer automobile from Shire 
took the same free from any lien of the Appellant. The 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fniform Trust Rereipt Aet, lf>-!3 Session Laws, PagPs 
255-6, reads as follows : 
'· "\Vhere the trustee, under the trust receipt 
trausaetion, has liberty of sale and sells to a 
buyer in the ordinary course of trade, whether 
before or after the expiration of the thirty day 
period specified in subsection 1 of Section 8 of 
this act, and whether or not filing has taken place, 
such buyer takes free of the entruster's security 
interest in the goods so sold, and no filing shall 
constitute notice of the en truster's security in-
terest to such a buyer." 
Respondent contends that Appellant's theory de-
feats its right to a Garnishment. This is not so. There is 
a difference between the relationship between the Bank 
and Shire and that of Appellant and Shire. The $1500.00 
note held by the Bank was secured by a chattel mort-
gage which was not foreclosed until after the Garnish-
ment. The $11,270.00 note was secured by a chattel mort-
gage on five Frazer automobiles. The Bank also held a 
trust receipt on the same automobiles. The chattel mort-
gage was never foreclosed and the Bank had in its pos-
session one of the automobiles so secured at the time of 
the Garnishment, which had not been sold. There can be 
no question but what the $1500.00 note was secured at the 
time of the Garnishment. We are aware of no way the 
bank can avoid the effect of the chattel mortgage on the 
five Frazer automobiles, but if in some unknown way 
it can be said that the Bank elected to forget the chattel 
mortgage and rely on the trust receipt, yet at the time of 
the Garnishment the Bank still had one of the automobiles 
included in the trust receipt in its possession which re-
mained unsold. So long as the mortgage was not fore-
11 
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closed and any of the automobiles remained undisposed 
of, the note and trust receipt were secured. On the other 
hand, all of the automobiles described in the trust receipts 
held by Appellant had been sold prior to the commence-
ment of the action. The trust receipts had been paid in the 
manner set forth in the testimony of Mr. Brothers (Tr. 
130). The security was no longer available to Appellant, 
as heretofore discussed. Appellant's suit is based upon 
three checks, payment for which was refused by the Bank, 
and which were not secured. 
A sufficient answer to the discussion with respect 
to the Milan Rogers contract on Pages 32 and 33 of Re-
spondent's brief is that if Respondent considers that it 
has an interest in the automobile, then such should be 
asserted against the automobile itself and not against the 
Appellant who is a purchaser of a contract for the sale 
of the same at Execution Sale. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 6 
The sheriff attached the interest of Shire in the 
Frazer automobile at a time when it was in possession of 
the Bank (Record 24-25). The attachment was made pur-
suant to Section 104-18-11. The liability of the Bank is 
governed by Section 104-18-12. Under this section, if the 
Bank chose to retain possession of the automobile there 
is no reason why Appellant should be charged with 
storage. The Sheriff did not take possession of the car. 
The attachment did not prevent the Bank from disposing 
of the automobile, but if the Bank chose to retain posses-
sion it should bear the cost of storage. There is no basis 
for the chargin,g of storage against Appellant at all. In 
12 
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any event, the Court determined $35.00 was a reasonable 
storage. If there was error it was in allowing the Bank 
any storage at all. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.7 
The Court did not err in awarding costs to Appel-
lant. In its Answer of Garnishment the Bank denied 
that it was indebted to Shire in any amount (Record 9). 
The trial Court held that the charges made by the Bank 
on Shire's account were unauthorized. Therefore, the 
Bank's Answer was successfully ''controverted'' and 
costs were rightfully awarded to the Appellant pursuant 
to the sections of the statute quoted by Respondent. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 8 
There was no error in refusing to admit Respond-
ent's proposed Exhibit "10." The date of the Exhibit, 
which is a letter, in April 2, 1948. The rights of the 
parties are to be determined as of February 24, 1948, the 
date of the service of the Writ of Garnishment. Whatever 
action the Bank took thereafter in attempting to dispose 
of its security under the trust receipt has no bearing 
upon the issues before this Court. 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
The only point raised by Respondent which was not 
discussed by Appellant in its original Brief is concerning 
Section 104-19-18. It would seem that this section has no 
application here, as Appellant seeks by this action to 
Garnishee the funds of Shire in the Bank and has not 
attempted to take possession of the mortgaged property 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the Bank. We see no way that Respondent can 
gain comfort in seeking help from Section 104-19-18 in an 
interpretation of Section 104-19-13, as Section 104-19-18 
covers an entirely different situation. 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore respectfully submit that the Court did 
not err in the manner contended for by the Respondent, 
but respectfully urge this Court to set aside the Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment of the Trial Court and to 
make Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the 
Appellant and against Respondent for the amounts charg-
ed by the Bank against the Defendant Shire's, account 
and which were applied on its secured indebtedness. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY AND BOYER, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
14 
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